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NOTES AND COMMENTS 01
The question raised in the principal case is one of considerable mag-
nitude, and it merits unusual consideration by reason of the fact that it
deals with a constitutional provision which purports to reserve rights and
powers to the people, not as individuals, but as a body politic. The
General Assembly ought to enact legislation at the earliest possible mo-
ment for the purpose of preventing the repeal or modification by the
councils of non-charter cities of initiated ordinances and ordinances ap-
proved by a referendum vote. Such legislation would secure to the
people of non-charter cities the protection which they intended to pro-
vide to themselves when they enacted the constitutional provisions with
regard to the initiative and referendum.
JAMES R. TRITSCHLER.
PERSONAL PROPERTY
BAILMENTS-STATUS OF OWNER OF AUTOMOBILE PARKING
LOT-LIABILITY FOR THEFT.
One Sheehan parked his car in defendant's parking lot and received
a parking ticket for which he paid the requisite fee. The ticket dis-
claimed any liability on the part of defendant for theft. The car was
stolen, even though Sheehan had locked it. One of the two attendants
in charge at the time saw the thief driving the car away, but was unable
to overtake him. Plaintiff insurance company, having paid Sheehan for
his loss, seeks to recover the value of the car. The Court of Appeals, in
reversing a judgment of the Municipal Court of Cleveland, held that
defendant, a bailee for hire, was not negligent and therefore not liable
for the theft of the car. One judge dissented. Syndicate Parking, Inc.
v. General Exchange Ins. Corp., et al., 17 Ohio Abs. 596 ('934).
The court, without discussing the point, proceeded upon the as-
sumption that the transaction in question constituted a bailment for hire.
Whether or not there was a bailment depends upon the extent of control
exercised by defendant over the car. Some courts have held that though
a fee is charged, if the owner can remove the car at will, there is
merely a license to park and not such a surrender of control as to con-
stitute a bailment. Lord v. Okla. State Fair dss'n., 95 Okla. 294, 219
Pac. 713 (1923); Thompson v. Mobile Light and Railway Co., 211
Ala. 525, 101 So. 177, 34 A.L.R. 921 (1924); and see Suits v. Elec-
tric Park Amusement Co., 213 Mo. App. 275 (1923). In none of
these cases was there any condition precedent to the owner's right to
possession. But where a condition precedent, such as the presentation
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of a parking ticket, has existed, the courts have classed the parking com-
pany as a bailee for hire. Galowitz v. Magner, 208 App. Div. 6, 203
N.Y.S. 421 (1924); General Exchange Ins. Corp. v. Service Parking
GroundsInc.,254 Mich. 1, 235 N.W. 898 (93I) ; Keenan Hotel Co.
v. Funk, 93 Ind. App. 677, 177 N.E. 364 (x93i); Baione v. Heavey,
103 Pa. Super. 529, i58A. I81 (932). The fact that it was neces-
sary for the owner to call at the office for his keys was held to have
made the parking company a bailee in Beetson v. Hollywood 4. C., io9
Cal. App. 715, 293 Pac. 821 (930). However, such a condition
precedent has not always been required. In Doherty v. Ernst, 284 Mass.
341, 187 N.E. 620 (1933), where keys were left in the car so that
the attendant might move it about, the court found that there was
sufficient control in the parking company to constitute a bailment. On
the basis of these decisions the court in the instant case was justified in
assuming that a bailment existed, since the owner could be excluded
from possession until he surrendered the parking ticket. See 30 Michigan
Law Review, 614 (1932); 12 Texas Law Review, 347 (1934)
Had the transaction in question been considered as a license to park
and not a bailment, defendant would have been under no duty to exer-
cise care against theft. Thompson v. Mobile Light & Railway Co.,
supra; Lord v. Okla. State Fair dss'n., supra. But since the court held
there was a bailment, defendant was liable for any lack of ordinary care
over the car. Hotels Statler Co. v. Safier, 103 Ohio St. 638, 134 N.E.
460, 22 A.L.R. 1190 (1921); 3 R.C.L. 96. And the fact that the
ticket disclaimed the parking company's liability for theft would not
relieve defendant of liability if the car was stolen through its negligence.
Keenan Hotel Co. v. Funk, supra; Baione v. Heavey, supra.
The courts uniformly hold that misdelivery imposes an absolute
liability on a bailee regardless of negligence. Potomac Ins. Co. v. Nick-
son, 64 Utah 395, 231 Pac. 445, 42 A.L.R. 128 (1924); Hall v.
Boston & W. R. Corp., 14 Allen (96 Mass.) 439, 92 Am. Dec. 783
(1867). But where the car is stolen, negligence must be proved, as a
bailee is not an insurer against theft. 3 R.C.L. 97. A failure to return
on demand raises, in itself, a strong inference of negligence, and it has
been held in cases similar to the principal one that a parking company
was clearly negligent in permitting a car to be removed without a sur-
render of the parking ticket. Galowitz v. Magner, supra; General Ex-
change Ins. Corp. v. Service Parking Grounds, Inc., supra. Viewing
the instant case in the light of these decisions, defendant might have
been found negligent in permitting the car to be entered and removed
without a surrender of the parking ticket.. The dissenting opinion sup-
NOTES AND COMMENTS b3
ports this view, holding that the facts did not justify a reversal of the
judgment of the trial court. However, since one of the attendants, as
soon as he discovered the thief, attempted in vain to stop him, there is
perhaps some justification for the court's decision.
ARCH. R. HICKs, JR.
RECEIVERS
APPOINTMENT WHEN CORPORATION CONSENTS-COLLATERAL
ATTACK.
The First National Bank & Trust Co. of Hamilton, a creditor of
the Fischer Hardware Co., took judgment upon a cognovit note against
the company on March 2, 1932. After entry of judgment a motion
was made for a receiver on the ground that execution would jeopardize
the financial stabilit, of the Hardware Co., the assets of which should
be conserved for the benefit of general creditors. The company con-
sented to such appointment.
September 21, 1933, the plaintiff, Michigan State Industries, filed
suit against the Hardware Co. on a book account and recovered judg-
ment, but execution was returned unsatisfied. Proceedings in aid, insti-
tuted November 13, 1933, were dismissed upon determination that the
plaintiff was not entitled to subject property in the hands of the receiver
to execution upon his judgment.
The Court of Appeals said that the appointment of the receiver was
void, notwithstanding the defendant corporation's consent, there being
no jurisdiction since there was an adequate remedy at law by levying
execution. Being void, such appointment was open to collateral attack.
But the plaintiff's delay in filing suit was held to amount to laches suf-
ficient to give rise to estoppel, so that there was no error in dismissing
the proceeding in aid of execution. Miichigan State Industries v. Fischer
Hardware Co., i9 Ohio Abs. 184, 2 Ohio Op. 171, 197 N.E. 785
(1934).
In Ohio, the power to appoint receivers is conferred by statute. A
receiver may be appointed: "4. After judgment, to dispose to property
according to the judgment, or to preserve it during the pendency of an
appeal, or when an execution has been returned unsatisfied and the
judgment debtor refuses to apply the property in satisfaction of the judg-
ment. 6. In all other cases in which receivers heretofore have
been appointed by the usages of equity." General Code, Sec. I 1894.
The general assertion is often made that ordinarily a receiver will
not be appointed at the instance of a mere simple contract creditor. The
